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PART TWO: THE U.S. AND MEXICAN COMPANIES
AGREE UPON SOME VERTICAL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
IN THEIR CONTRACT
MICHAEL W. GORDON,*
GABRIEL CASTAIREDA GALLARDO,**
HARVEY M. APPLEBAUM,***
ELEANOR M. FOX****
THE PROBLEM
Having resolved issues above relating to the form of the distribution of
GROWFAST products in Mexico, the president of GROWFAST has now
asked you to prepare the final agreement with AGRICOLAS, S.A. de
C.V. GROWFAST is aware that AGRICOLAS is very interested in signing
the agreement and will agree to various limitations on activities which
GROWFAST believes would be adverse to its concept of AGRICOLAS'
role in the distribution of GROWFAST products in North America. The
provisions which GROWFAST has included in the draft agreement, and
to which AGRICOLAS has raised no objection fearing loss of the pro-
spective distributorship, include the following:
1. AGRICOLAS must restrict its sales of SollateTM to the Federal
District and the State of Mexico.
2. AGRICOLAS must not resell any SollateTM to retail sellers in the
United States, which would compete with GROWFAST's carefully
developed distribution channels in the United States.
3. AGRICOLAS must receive approval of GROWFAST before agree-
ing to distribute any competing products of other manufacturers.
4. All prices of SollateTM charged by AGRICOLAS in Mexico which
deviate from the GROWFAST schedule of prices must be preapproved
by GROWFAST.
5. The distributorship does not exclude the possibility of direct sales
by GROWFAST to customers in the Federal District of State of
Mexico.
These provisions are vertical restrictions on trade. They have been dictated
by GROWFAST, without objection by AGRICOLAS (although AGRI-
COLAS thought they were too restrictive, AGRICOLAS believed it could
nevertheless profit selling SollateTM even with these restraints).
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THE DISCUSSION
Michael Gordon: Are any of the provisions of the problem in violation
of either United States antitrust laws or the Mexican competition law?
Gabriel Castafleda: In the case of the Mexican law, the first issue that
arises is what is the relevant market for the fungicide, SollateTM? IS it
a Mexican territory relevant market or is it a U.S.-Mexico relevant market?
That is the first thing we have to discuss and it is a very touchy thing
involving many issues. My view is that while there are some obstacles
to entry, such as tariffs, government regulations and so on, we cannot
think of a common U.S.-Mexico relevant market, although the Mexican
law provides for exactly that. There is no difference between bringing
the fungicide from Chihuahua than from Texas. Mexican law says that
if we find some obstacles along the way, we will have to carry them
over into the analysis of the proper relevant market and ease of entry
analysis.
For the purposes of this discussion, let's suppose there are severe
obstacles to market entry in the Mexican territory and the relevant market
is the Mexican market. We then have to assess the market power of the
players. Are we talking about a vertical restriction or what we would
call exclusionary practices here? Does our Mexican partner or client have
substantial power in the market? Can he or she manipulate prices, that
is, push prices up, stabilize prices, or exercise predatory practices? That
is the first test to consider.
Next, we have to look at the alternative sources of the product. The
case says that the U.S. exporter has absolute power in the United States
where there is only one product producer. If there is another kind of
fungicide that could be more effective than the one we are addressing,
then there is a competitor in that specific relevant market.
A good feature of the Mexican law is that it is very much efficiency
oriented. That means, we will have to find an injured party before there
will be problems in the antitrust arena of Mexico, either someone who
wants to get into the fungicide market or someone who is already in
the market and is being threatened by a specific exclusionary practice.
From a distribution point of view, the questions to ask are: has the
distributor been injured by one of the specific clauses? And is there an
abuse of a dominant position in the Mexican territory? If we cannot
find an injured party here and AGRICOLAS agrees to the restrictive
clauses, there is no problem.
Harvey Applebaum: Could customers or injured parties make the ar-
gument that other prices might have been lower but for the vertical price
fixing agreement? Under Mexican antitrust law can the customers of the
distributor, be considered injured parties due to vertical restrictions?
Castafleda: They can be considered injured parties if they can prove
actual injury. The key question here is are there alternative products?
If there are no alternative products, customers can certainly bring a suit
before the Competition Commission and obtain a remedy.
Let me comment about the probabilities of CFC involvement. The way
that the law has been drafted, there is the possibility of Commission
[Vol. 4
PANEL DISCUSSION: PART TWO
involvement on an ex-officio basis, but I would say this is very unlikely
unless there is evidence of damage to the competition process. There
probably would have to be obvious and considerable evidence of damage
in the relevant market.
Applebaum: From the U.S. law standpoint, there are really two ques-
tions: one is whether the proposed agreement would only affect com-
petition or commerce in Mexico and the other is whether that would
violate the U.S. Sherman Act?
Generally speaking, I think a vertical price fixing or territorial allocation
between a U.S. supplier and a foreign distributor, in this instance, a
Mexican distributor, ordinarily would not violate the Sherman Act because
there is insufficient impact on U.S. commerce. It is not substantial or
foreseeable because the impact would ordinarily be only within Mexico.
Let's assume that the vertical price fixing, vertical exclusive dealing, and
vertical territorial allocations could injure competition within Mexico,
either at the manufacturer level, or as I was suggesting in my question,
at the level of the customers of the distributor. That would not ordinarily
raise any U.S. antitrust law issue. U.S. antitrust law can apply to exports
from the United States, but ordinarily does not apply to vertical relations
within a foreign country.
Gordon: What if the agreement was entirely in reverse and we had a
U.S. distributor serving a Mexican manufacturer?
Applebaum: Then I think we can summarily state that the vertical
price fixing is illegal, per se, under the United States antitrust laws. This
has been a controversial area for years, but the Supreme Court has never
backed off its very clear position that vertical price fixing is, per se,
unlawful, and cannot be defended.' While the Supreme Court has not
reviewed a criminal case in many years, vertical price fixing is subject
to criminal prosecution, and state attorney generals have brought criminal
actions in recent years.
The other vertical arrangements, territorial restrictions and exclusive
restrictions, are not, per se, unlawful. They were unlawful from the 1967
Supreme Court ruling in the Schwinn case2 until the Sylvania case3 in
1977. Now they are governed by the rule of reason. If there is inter-
brand competition and the absence of market power, they are ordinarily
quite defensible. Since Sylvania, only a small handful of private plaintiffs
have successfully challanged what we call non-price vertical restraints.
So now, there is a very clear dichotomy under U.S. antitrust law between
vertical price restraints that remain unlawful, per se, and vertical non-
price restraints, which are under the rule of reason.
Eleanor Fox: I agree with my colleagues. Looking at the example of
GROWFAST as the U.S. producer and AGRICOLAS the distributor in
Mexico, I too was looking to see how that could possibly have any anti-
1. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
2. United States v. Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
3. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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competitive effect that would be illegal under U.S. laws. To be illegal
under U.S. competition law, you must first have a U.S. consumer that
is harmed. Here that is not the case. If there is, for example, retail price
maintenance in Mexico, even if it is illegal in Mexico, that certainly
doesn't hurt anyone in the United States.
To devise a problem that might hurt someone in the United States,
let us suppose that Sollate TM is a monopoly product in Mexico, but not
in the United States. Next, let's assume that AGRICOLAS has a well-
functioning distribution system, that it is virtually impossible for another
American company to set up its own distributorship or to obtain another
distributor in Mexico, and that another U.S. producer wants to enter
the Mexican market. Finally, imagine that the U.S. producer goes to
AGRICOLAS and says, "I want you to distribute my product for me
in Mexico and I know you have the facilities to do so," and AGRI COLAS
replies, "Oh no, I can't because I've promised GROWFAST that I won't
take on any competitors." That exchange creates an interesting problem,
one that is being hotly discussed in the United States. Do U.S. laws
apply to protect the exports of the U.S. competitor to SollateTM that
wants to get into Mexico? There are two points of view on this. One
is that there is no U.S. antitrust problem because, although Mexican
customers are hurt, no U.S. consumer is hurt. The other is that there
is a U.S. antitrust problem because the exclusion from the Mexican
market injures a U.S. producer.
From a global or continental point of view, one would wish, first,
that Mexico would enforce its own law, because there is distinct consumer
harm in Mexico. If for some reason, not relating to the merits of the
case, Mexico could not enforce its own law, there should be a North
America remedy. Because the anti-competitive restraint hurts exports and
a competitor's opportunities, perhaps the U.S. law ought to be available
if the excluded competitor sues.
Gordon: I assume that if a company like Coca-Cola entered into an
agreement with a Mexican distributor and then said that the Mexican
distributor could not carry Pepsi, and locked Pepsi out of the Mexican
market, there could be problems under both U.S. and Mexican anti-
competition law.
Applebaum: If Mexico had its own soft drink producers who were
blocking Pepsi out in a concerted fashion, with or without the assistance
of Coca Cola, then you have something beyond what we have been
talking about. This would go beyond competition between U.S. exporters.
If the exclusion from the Mexican market is by a group of Mexican
companies, both Section 301 of the Trade Act of 19744 and the inter-
national antitrust guidelines of the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission 5 could be applicable. Suits by the Department of
4. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
5. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations (April 1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) P 13,107.
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Justice, the FTC and by private parties under the Sherman Act6 could
be considered. This has also been a controversial area: whether the U.S.
antitrust laws should be concerned about whether there is vigorous com-
petition within Mexico on the hypothetical soft drinks. At one time the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice took the position that,
since U.S. consumer welfare was not affected, the Sherman Act did not
apply. That was reversed a couple of years ago as confirmed in the
current Department of Justice international guidelines. At the present
time, if the market access exclusion is by a cartel, conspiracy or boycott
by potential competitors in the foreign market, the position of the U.S.
enforcement agencies is that U.S. antitrust law does apply.
Where the exclusion results from a good deal struck by one U.S.
exporter with a foreign distributor, and another U.S. exporter can not
get into the market because that distributor is locked up, the issue is
more questionable.
Castafieda: Two comments on that. First, in the case of Mexico, being
a monopoly is not illegal, per se. The question is one of market entry.
It is not illegal for an American company to sell its products on an
exclusive basis through an agent in Mexico. The second thing is that the
U.S. extra-territorial application of its competition law to Mexico would
mean that the relevant geographical dimension of the market would have
to be the U.S. territory and the Mexican territory.
Fox: I want to comment on that statement about market definition.
He said, that both the United States and Mexico would have to be
included as part of the relevant market. I think that he is theoretically
correct and maybe Mexico would do it that way, but the United States
would not. In its 'market access' claims involving U.S. car companies
that want to gain entry into Japan, the United States accepts the frame-
work that is set forth in the international operations guidelines and treats
Japan as a separate market.
Let us examine the significance of whether the United States and Mexico
are considered a single market or separate markets. Assume again that
we have the same vertical restraint and that GROWFAST has appointed
AGRICOLAS its sole and exclusive distributor in Mexico. Also, assume
that GROWFAST and its U.S. competitor sell 5% of their product in
Mexico and the remaining 9506 in the United States. If there is a combined
U.S.- Mexico relevant market, then the vertical restraint affects only 5%
of the market. That is not very much. Alternatively, if you define Mexico
as the market, you have a vertical restraint that excludes 100% and that
looks much weightier. Under the latter scenario, one is more likely to
come to a conclusion that there is an exclusionary restraint serious enough
to elicit antitrust enforcement.
Castalleda: Let us assume again the case of two U.S. exporters, one
of which has an exclusive distributor agreement in Mexico, and another
U.S. company says it has been threatened by this exclusionary practice
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
19961
U.S. -MEXICO LAW JOURNAL
and is injured by it. This brings up the issue of export cartels. What is
important here is the effect this is this going to have in the Mexican
territory. Perhaps those two U.S. exporters get together and say, "I'll
sell 50%, you sell 50%; I get half the country, and you get the other
half." Is that violating U.S. law?
Fox: No.
Castafieda: It should, but it doesn't.
Applebaum: The U.S. Law doesn't apply only if you have a Webb-
Pomerene company,7 or a Certificate of Review under the Export Trading
Company Act.8
Castafieda: The Mexican position would be about the same. The way
Mexican law is now drafted, it could accept that the relevant market
analysis would cover two U.S. exporters wanting to come into the Mexican
market. But I would say that this illustrates the need to develop a uniform
position in North America with some sort of reciprocity.
Gordon: As noted above, the U.S. position is that vertical price fixing
is illegal, per se. What is the view in Mexico?
Castafieda: Vertical price fixing is not illegal, per se, in Mexico. You
have to prove (1) that there is a clear relevant market; (2) that there is
substantial market power; and (3) that there is injury to someone wanting
to come into the market, or someone who is inside the market that is
being threatened to be pushed out of that market. This means that if
there is no one who could actually compete in that market and if there
is no one injured in that market, there is no injury to the market and
no unlawful practice.
Let us look at it the other way around. Let's suppose for a moment
there are two large U.S. corporations doing business in Mexico through
subsidiaries that have 90% of the relevant Mexican market. The merger
of the two subsidiaries is closed in a transaction in the United States.
That specific transaction does impinge on the Mexican territory. If the
relevant market is the United States plus the Mexican territory, under
Mexican competition law, the effect of the transaction is that competition
in Mexico will just disappear. There is no violation of competition law
in Mexico because the relevant market includes competition that is done
or experienced in the United States. Remember, Mexico's economy is
about the size of Chicago's economy. It is important for the parties to
NAFTA to think about whether NAFTA should be considered a common
relevant market for purposes of each parties competition law.
Applebaum: One of the many advantages to U.S. companies of invoking
a trade law rather than an antitrust law is that there is not this relevant
market concern. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 talks about un-
7. A Webb-Pomerene company is an export trade company, usually composed only of U.S.
corporations, which is authorized by the Federal Trade Commission to act as an export cartel with
limited immunity from prosecution under the federal antitrust statutes. Webb-Pomerene Export
Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1994).
8. 16 C.F.R. § 1.42 (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1994).
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reasonable burden on United States commerce. 9 Section 301 was amended
in 1988 to add a provision that authorizes the United States Trade
Representative to take action if a foreign government is tolerating sys-
tematic anti-competitive practices that burden U.S. commerce. That pro-
vision remained on the books unused until a few months ago when
Eastman Kodak Company, Inc., filed a Section 301 petition alleging that
the Japanese government had for many years not only tolerated but
assisted Fuji Photo Film Co.,Ltd., in exclusionary practices in the Japanese
market.10 In considering this in the context of the Mexican antitrust law,
note that the law requires a showing that the foreign government tolerated
a violation of its own law.
About a year ago there was an allegation that the Mexican Commerce
Department was assisting Mexican sugar producers in preventing high
fructose corn syrup produced in the United States from entering Mexico.
Corn syrup is a sugar substitute. There was a letter circulated and signed
by a number of members of the U.S. Congress, urging the U.S. Trade
Representative to invoke Section 301 against Mexico, on the theory that
the Mexican government was tolerating systematic anti-competitive prac-
tices." The foreign government doesn't have to assist or take any af-
firmative steps, although that's been alleged with regard to film in Japan
by Kodak; it simply has to fail to take action. In the context of the
NAFTA, it would have been very interesting if the United States had
brought a Section 301 action alleging that Mexico was not enforcing its
own antitrust law to the detriment of U.S. exports.
Gordon: Who has the right to bring a challenge in these cases? You
mentioned before that there has to be some injured party. One would
presume the injured party would have the right to bring the challenge,
but is the U.S. Trade Representative able on its own to initiate an action
if it has a complaint filed before it by the injured party?
Applebaum: Yes, Section 2411 of the United States Code 12 provides
that the U.S. Trade Representative has the authority to bring such an
action.
Gordon: Mr. Castafieda, would you comment on proceedings by the
Mexican Competition Commission to enforce its decision in the courts?
What is the capacity of the Mexican judicial system to understand the
complexity of these issues?
9. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
10. Notice, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 60 Fed. Reg. 35447 (1995).
11. Inside U.S. Trade, June 3, 1994, at 8.
12. Section 301(a) requires the U.S. Trade Representative to bring actions with or without
complaint by injured parties where the rights of the United states under any trade agreement are
being denied or an act of a foreign country is "unjustifiable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce."
Section 301(b) authorizes discretionary actions by the U.S. Trade Representative if he determines
that an act of a foreign country is "unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce." Under Section 302, investigations may be commenced by petition of "interested persons"
which includes U.S. firms and workers, representatives of consumer interests, U.S. product exporters
and certain industrial users of goods and services. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2495
(1995). see discussion in Folsom and Gordon, International business Transactions §§ 14.4-14.9 (1995).
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Castafieda: With regard to the interface between the Commission's
decisions and the judiciary, I would say that it is only on constitutional
rights violations that the federal courts will intervene. In Mexico, we
have what we call "the guarantee of legality" which may be raised in
an amparo proceeding. 13 This means that the party which is not satisfied
that the Commission has applied the law properly may seek some sort
of remedy before the courts. That certainly is going to induce the
Commission to get a consent agreement before litigation. What is going
to be the outcome if there is litigation? I am quite optimistic about it.
There is a group of three or four federal judges I know who have been
studying competition laws for some time now. One of them had the
opportunity to look at two of the three cases that are subject to amparo
proceedings at this time. I am very satisfied that federal judges will have
enough interest to go into the details. I think there are checks and
balances between the judiciary and the Competition Commission which
is very healthy.
Fox: With regard to the interpretation of the Mexican antitrust law
by the Mexican courts, I believe that in a civil code country like Mexico,
there is a tendency of the courts to read the laws more rigidly than
would be consistent with a flexible "rule of reason." However, I un-
derstand that Mr. Castafeda would interpret the Mexican statute flexibly.
For example, Article 10 of the Mexican Economic Competition Law on
relative monopolistic practices, seems to cover all conduct other than
cartel practices. It seems to me that there is a reading of that relative
monopolistic section which would find these practices illegal if the chal-
lenged firm has substantial market power. Is there a possibility that when
these cases are litigated, the Mexican federal courts are going to find
the relative restrictive practices to be illegal only if the imposing party
has substantial market power?
Castaileda: Article 10 sets out some examples of exclusionary practices,
like vertical price fixing, exclusive distribution contracts, tying, boycotts,
but it also has a great catch-all, section 714, which incorporates all other
practices that could unduly restrain competition. The first part of the
article also says quite clearly that those practices will be deemed illegal
if it is proven that there is: 1) a clear relevant market; 2) substantial
market power by the accused party; 3) an assessment of market entry
13. In Mexico, the legal concept of amparo involves legal protection of rights specified in the
Law of Amparo by procedural remedies. It has been described as having "five diverse functions:
(1) protection of individual guarantees; (2) testing allegedly unconstitutional laws; (3) contesting
judicial decisions; (4) petitioning against official administrative acts and resolutions; and (5) protection
of farmers subject to the agrarian reform laws." H. Fix Zamudio, "A Brief Introduction to the
Mexican Writ of Amparo," 9 Calif. W.Int'l L.J. 306, 316 (1979).
14. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica (Federal Economic Competition Law), ch. II, art.
10 VII, DE.Ro OrictAL DE LA FEDERACI6N (Daily Gazette of the Federation) (Dec. 24, 1992) (En
general, todo acto que indebidamente dana o impida el proceso de competencia y libre concurrencia
en la produccion, procesamiento, distribucion y comercializacion de bienes o servicios.)(Any act in
general, that unduly impairs or impedes the process of competition and free participation in the
production, processing, distribution and marketing of goods or services.).
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for alternative products or services in the specific market, and 4) (most
importantly) standing before the Commission by an injured party. If
there's not an injured party, i.e., someone who's been thrown out of
the market, or someone who cannot come into the market, there is no
way the Commission would deem that there has been an illegal practice.
It is arguable that consumers would have standing before the Commission.
However, the original idea was not to bring the consumers in. I'm not
very familiar with the international practice about consumers, but in
Mexico consumers are now well organized. We have thought about
requiring that there be substantial groups of consumers, a sort of class
action, in order to have standing to complain to the Competition Com-
mission. Mexican law was carefully drafted to avoid inefficient suits;
Mexico not being the litigious society that the United States is.
Gordon: Let's move on to the question of remedies. You do provide
for injunctive relief. However, Mexico doesn't have treble damages,
although there is a provision that seems to provide for double damages
for habitual offenders. Could you comment on that?
Castahieda: We have injunctive relief to suspend the practice itself, and
then a single damage provision. You don't get that directly from the
Commission, which is an administrative entity, but rather from a judge.
So you need a decision saying the Commission is satisfied with the
plaintiff's assessment of the practice itself, and with the plaintiff's claim
to damages. If you get that decision, you go to a federal judge and get
an actual judicial decision to obtain damages.
Applebaum: After the Commission has made the assessment and the
injured party is entitled to go to the Court, does the Commission play
any role in the judicial proceedings? Is it a party, does it have any
status, does it intervene?
Castafieda: According to the Mexican Code of Federal Procedure, the
Commission can be called by the judge to make comments or give opinions
after the administrative decision, but the Commission is not a party. The
Commission's job ends when the Commission renders its decision.
Gordon: Would the commission be involved in recommending a certain
level of damages?
Castafieda: The way it works is that the Commission will not offer
any sort of damage calculation or assessment. It will react to the damages
claim brought by the plaintiff. The law is very clear. You have to prove
the amount of damages, and the assessment of damages, before the
Commission. The Commission may say we think you are right, there
has been a breach or violation of the competition law, but we think
your assessment of damages is not right.
Gordon: Aren't these damages for violation of the Economic Com-
petition Law quite high compared to other Mexican laws?
Castafieda: The parties do not pay much attention to the assessments
of damages in Mexico. There has not yet been one case under the
competition law where the amount of damages has been brought before
the courts in Mexico. Even in the United States, few cases end in an
actual decision. There are out-of-court settlements, In Mexico, that hap-
pens very often.
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